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 1 
Judicial Mediation: From Debates to Renewal 
 
- Jean-Francois Roberge & Dorcas Quek Anderson* 
 
 
Summary 
 
Judicial mediation involving a judge acting as a mediator in a court dispute has been 
implemented in many jurisdictions worldwide as a way to overcome access to justice 
challenges. This innovation has raised many debates on the changing role of the judge built on 
either its congruence with or divergence from judicial adjudication. Over the years, these 
debates have become increasingly stagnant. The evolving vision on access to justice brings an 
opportunity to draw from the earlier debates and forge a different way forward. This paper 
argues that a coequality approach to understanding judicial mediation is a better way to design 
the process in a way that respects the distinctive qualities of mediation and the justice system, 
and to create a renewed judicial mediation model. Based upon Singapore and Canada’s strong 
commitment to access to justice and long-standing judicial mediation experiences, the paper 
proposes an “Integrative Judicial Mediation” model.   
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 3 
Introduction 
 
Access to justice has been associated with consensual ways of resolving disputes for many 
decades. According to Cappelletti and Garth, the third wave of the access to justice movement 
broadened the search for justice beyond advocacy in the courts, focusing instead on the full 
panoply of ways to resolve conflicts.1 Worldwide, delivering justice is now an evolving concept 
arising from a confluence of two streams that were once disparate – Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) and adjudication through the judicial system2. ADR mechanisms, such as 
mediation, emphasize party autonomy over the outcome, confidentiality within a private 
process and a broad consideration of a whole range of interests apart from legal rights. By 
contrast, the adjudication process involves the imposition of a decision on the disputants, the 
application of legal principles alone and a largely public process.  
 
Studies on the history of the representation of justice show different traditions in the 
iconography of justice that depicts a constant evolution of the position of the judge3. In recent 
times, the courts have been conceptualized as multi-door courthouses providing a diverse range 
of dispute resolution processes4. The judge is now a multi-tasking judge, possessing areas of 
expertise beyond adjudication. 5 Judges in civil and common law jurisdictions worldwide have 
been increasingly involved in settlement and case management activities.6 Our paper focuses 
                                               
1 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: the Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make 
Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. LAW REV. 181, 223-24 (1977-1978).  
2  For the fundamental principles of ADR and access to justice, see Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56(3) THE MODERN 
LAW REV. 282, 283 (1993). For an application of ADR’s value in delivering effective civil justice, therefore 
enhancing adherence to rule of law, see World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index (2016), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016.   
3  See JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, THE EYES OF JUSTICE. BLINDFOLDS AND FARSIGHTEDNESS, VISION AND 
BLINDNESS IN THE AESTHETICS OF THE LAW (Vittorio Klostermann 2017) (identifying eight traditions that can be 
classified in three main epocas : (1) Justice that sees all, from Mesopotamia to Venice where the judging position 
consists of seeing all actions and penetrating most intimate intentions of humans beings; (2) Justice blindfolded 
that began to develop at the end of the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the Renaissance where the judging 
position require equality of all before the law; and finally (3) the search for new ways of representing the gaze of 
justice triggered by a crisis of the law which calls for an important reflections on justice and the judge office). See 
also JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN 
CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (Yale University Press 2011). 
4 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, The Pound Conference (Address Delivered at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, April 7-9, 1976) 70 F.R.D. 
111, 130-31 (1976). 
5 Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 OHIO STATE J. OF DISP. 
RESOL. 1 (1987), referring to his earlier work in WAYNE D BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS’ VIEWS 
ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 39 and 44 (American Bar 
Association 1985); TANIA SOURDIN & ARCHIE ZARISKI (eds.), THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE 
JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Thomson Reuters 2013).  
6 See generally TANIA SOURDIN & ARCHIE ZARISKI supra note 5; FABIEN GÉLINAS ET AL. FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL 
JUSTICE. TOWARDS A VALUE-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM. (Springer 2015); LAURA ERVO & ANNA NYLUND 
(eds.) THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIGATION. ACCESS TO COURTS AND COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN THE NORDIC 
COUNTRIES (Springer 2014); See also Machteld W. de Hoon & Suzan Verberk, Towards a More Responsive 
Judge: Challenges and Opportunities, 10:4 UTRECHT L. REV 27 (2014); Michal Alberstein, Judicial Conflict 
Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudence for an Emerging Judicial Practice, 16 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 
879 (2015); and Jean-Francois Roberge, “Sense of Access to Justice” as a Framework for Civil Procedure Justice 
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specifically on judicial mediation, an innovation arising from the changing role of the judge. 
Judicial mediation in this paper refers to a process involving a judge acting as a mediator in a 
court dispute. Many courts have encountered challenges in designing and implementing this 
unique process that draws inspiration from the traditions of both ADR and the conventional 
justice system. On one hand, some critics have expressed different views on the legitimacy of 
the process, its capacity to enhance access to justice, the potential benefits and whether it is the 
best investment of judicial resources. On the other hand, many scholars have recognized that 
mediation can deliver justice, although the meaning of “justice” is still a subject of discussion7.    
 
Many debates concerning judicial mediation have built on either the congruence or the 
divergence between ADR and litigation. The “divergence approach” focuses on mediation’s 
distinctive qualities compared to litigation, such as process flexibility and tailor-made solutions. 
It appraises the potential of judicial mediation from the perspective of how distinct it is from 
the litigation process. The “congruence approach” has instead concentrated on the merits of 
judicial mediation based on the similarities between mediation and litigation, focusing on 
characteristics such as the judge’s functions or the use of legal principles as a basis for 
negotiation and settlements. It evaluates the legitimacy and contribution of judicial mediation 
with lenses premised on the adjudication process. In other words, the overall debate has 
centered on how far or how close judicial mediation is to justice traditions, in order to still be 
considered as part of the justice process. Both approaches have led to debates which are still 
recurring today and becoming less fruitful over the years in their contribution to the state of 
knowledge on judicial mediation.  
 
After more than three decades of critical studies on the fundamentals of judicial mediation and 
practices, it is time to overcome the increasingly stagnant debates on the appropriate distance 
or similarities between mediation and litigation processes. The divergence and congruence 
approaches have reached their limits in building the first generation of judicial mediation. 
Moreover, judicial mediation has to be rethought to keep up with the rapid evolution of access 
to justice in recent years. Many jurisdictions are now experiencing an emerging trend towards 
a user-centric vision of access to justice or what has been described as a normative 
                                               
Reform: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Settlement Conference in Quebec (Canada) 17 CARDOZO J. OF 
CONFLICT RESOL. 323 (2016). 
7 See Sherif Elnegahy, Can Mediation deliver Justice? 18 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 759 (2017); 
Ellen Waldman & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Mediators and Substantive Justice: A View from Rawls’ Original Position, 
30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2014-2016) ; Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in 
Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 281 (2012) ; Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 
6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213 (2005); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An 
Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, (2002–03) ; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787 (2001) ;  Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 775 (1999) ; Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 909, 
911–12 (1998); Ellen Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multi Model Approach, 48 
HASTINGS L. J. 703, 727-733 (1996-1997) ; Dean E. Peachey, What People Want from Mediation, in MEDIATION 
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 300 (Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. 
Pruitt eds., 1989).  
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 5 
individualism perspective.8 This approach centers on the individual as the source and focus of 
access to justice. The elements of access to justice are increasingly defined according to 
individual perspectives. The processes used in the justice process are also directed towards 
meeting individual needs. In this regard, many jurisdictions have stressed how the mediation 
process accentuates individual participation in the justice process, makes the overall justice 
system more accessible and potentially achieves outcomes that satisfy individual needs.9 It is 
therefore an opportune time to draw from the earlier debates concerning judicial mediation to 
build the next generation of judicial mediation. 
 
This paper argues that adopting a “coequality approach” is critical to forging a way forward to 
create a renewed judicial mediation model. A coequality 10  perspective recognizes that 
mediation and adjudication are equally valid processes within the justice system. It does not 
denigrate one process at the expense of the other, and yet it also respects and seeks to preserve 
the key differences between both processes. The first section of our paper will address ongoing 
debates concerning the potentials and benefits of judicial mediation, and suggest reframing 
these arguments from the coequality stance. These positive and negative aspects will serve as 
a stepping stone for further discussion. We will then dedicate the second section of our paper 
to renewed principles for judicial mediation. We will suggest a model inspired by strong 
commitment and long-standing judicial mediation experiences in Canada and Singapore.11 Our 
overarching goal in this paper is to bring a new theoretical perspective, generate opportunities 
for renewed analysis in the field of judicial mediation, and to stimulate innovative ideas for 
future reforms in access to justice and dispute resolution.  
 
 
                                               
8 See Felix Steffik & Hannes Unberath, Principled Regulation of Dispute Resolution: Taxonomy, Policy, Topic, 
in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 33, 43 (Felix Steffek 
& Hannes Unberath eds, 2013).  
9 See e.g., Quebec, Code of Civil Procedure R.S.Q., C-25 (Can.), preliminary provision, para 2 and Articles 1-7 
(emphasizing the goals of efficiency, promptness, accessibility and quality of civil justice, together with the use 
of fair-minded processes; making a call to avoid litigation and to focus on preventing and resolving disputes 
instead; and articulating principles underlying dispute resolution such as self-determination and good faith); 
Singapore Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Keynote Address, State Courts Annual Workplan 2017, 11-12 (17 
March 2017), 
https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/Resources/Documents/State%20Courts%20Workplan%202017%20Keynote%20
Address%20by%20Chief%20Justice%28FINAL%29.pdf. (stating how consensual ways to resolve disputes is one 
of the best ways to enhance access to justice and that the traditional adversarial adjudication process is not always 
appropriate). 
10 According to the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (7th ed, 2013), the term “coequal” refers to being of the same 
rank, power, importance or value as another; or being of equivalent extent as another. See also MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY which defines the term as being equal to the other. 
11 Canada, a vast country in the northern hemisphere with British and French influences, has civil law and common 
law traditions in its justice system. Singapore, a multi-cultural nation-state in Southeast Asia, has its legal tradition 
rooted in common law. Despite the diversity of their historical and legal traditions, they have both developed 
themselves as leaders in performing judicial mediation in a way to enhance access to justice.      
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1. Debates on Judicial Mediation - Between Divergence and 
Congruence 
 
The term “judicial mediation” has varying meanings in different legal traditions. Some 
countries use the broader term of judicial dispute resolution to describe a large range of judicial 
settlement activities that are both advisory and facilitative, or all types of work undertaken by 
judges to encourage settlement.12 Others including Brunet and Hensler understand judicial 
mediation to involve primarily evaluative rather than facilitative techniques.13 In the United 
States, the term “judicial settlement conference” is more commonly used, owing to the judges’ 
practices of convening pre-trial settlement conferences under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.14  
 
This article refers to judicial mediation as a primarily facilitative mediation process conducted 
by a judge in respect of a civil dispute. This judge will not preside over the trial in the event 
that no settlement is reached. The discussions are also kept confidential and not revealed to the 
trial judge. This form of judicial mediation is practiced in both Canada15 and Singapore.16 For 
reasons that will be evident below, judicial mediation is defined this way to distinguish the 
process from advisory processes such as mini-trials, arbitration and early neutral evaluation.17  
                                               
12  See generally SOURDIN & ZARISKI, supra note 5, at 2-3; NATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
ADVISORY COUNCIL (NADRAC), THE RESOLVE TO RESOLVE – EMBRACING ADR TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE IN THE FEDERAL JURISIDICTION, AND JUSTICE IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 106-107 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009); ONTARIO BAR ASSOCIATION, A DIFFERENT ‘DAY IN COURT’ THE ROLE OF 
THE JUDICIARY IN FACILITATING SETTLEMENTS 9-11 (2013).  
13 Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, NEV. LAW J. 232, 234 (2002/2003); STACY LEE BURNS, 
MAKING SETTLEMENT WORK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF JUDICIAL MEDIATORS 7 (Ashgate 2001) 
(stating that sitting judges mediate by offering their opinions on what a fair settlement would be); Deborah Hensler, 
A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 15  (Fall 1999) 
(suggesting that judicial mediation is evaluative rather than facilitative, and that “court mediation is a lot like a 
settlement conference”); Lawrence F. Schiller & James A. Wall, Jr, Judicial Settlement Techniques, 5 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 39, 52 (1981). 
14 Nancy Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The Application of Procedural Justice Research to Judicial 
Actions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 59-62 (Sourdin & Zariski eds., 2013). 
15 See generally Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation 
of Justice 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351 (2006); Jean-François Roberge, Could Judicial Mediation Deliver a Better 
Justice? What if we TRAIN judges as EXPATS?, 1(1) J. OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 3 (2010); Michaela 
Keet & Brent Cotter, Settlement Conferences and Judicial Role: The Scaffolding for Expanded Thinking about 
Judicial Ethics, 91 CAN. B. REV. 363 (2012); Jean-François Roberge, Emerging Trends in Access to Justice and 
Dispute Resolution in Canada  4(2) J. OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 69 (2014); Roberge, supra note 6.  
16 See generally Joyce Low & Dorcas Quek, An Overview of Court Mediation in the State Courts of Singapore, 
in MEDIATION IN SINGAPORE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 2017); Singapore State Courts, Code 
of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation 
https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/CivilCase/Documents/CodeOfEthics-and-BasicPrinciplesOnCourtMediation-
190314.pdf. (articulating key values of “respect” and “empowerment” involving understanding litigants’ concerns 
and honoring their right to decide, and maximizing each party’s capacity to make choices; and stating that the 
mediator “shall always respect the parties’ right to decide” and “shall not use any language or conduct himself in 
any manner that may give rise to an impression that the parties must settled the matter according to his suggestion 
or direction”). 
17 In this paper, we adopt the following definitions drawn from STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, 
NANCY H ROGERS & SARAH DUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER 
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Judicial mediation has not been a process that is welcomed in all countries. The very notion of 
a judge being engaged in settlement activities has precipitated debates concerning how the 
process can be reconciled with both the practice of mediation and the justice system. There 
have been arguments advanced along the divergence approach, pointing out how judicial 
mediation must closely resemble mediation and be clearly distinguishable from adjudication. 
Conversely, critics adopting a congruence approach focus on how judicial mediation should 
be more identical with the fundamental characteristics of adjudication. We turn to address both 
perspectives that have fueled debates on the potential and limitations of judicial mediation for 
several decades, with no clear solution in sight. These arguments will be analyzed below 
according to two overarching themes – the legitimate need for judicial mediation, as well as 
how judicial mediation is inconsistent with existing processes. In this section, we also propose 
a way forward from the binary debates by adopting a wholly new perspective to understanding 
judicial mediation – the coequality approach.  
 
A. The Legitimate Need Debate 
 
Objections to judicial mediation have been raised at the most fundamental level – why is there 
even a need for judicial mediation? This question is embedded within other more complex 
issues concerning the primary role of the court, the attributes of a judge and the allocation of 
judicial resources.  
 
Between Divergence and Congruence   
Critics who have adopted the divergence approach generally perceive mediation to be 
thoroughly incompatible with the core judicial role. Much of this criticism was made in the 
“golden age” of mediation spanning from the late 1990s to first decade of the 21st century.18  
As Menkel-Meadow noted, these commentators commonly assume that the courts have a 
predominantly adjudicative function.19 In this connection, Fiss has asserted that the courts exist 
“not to resolve disputes” but to give meaning to public values. Resnik, when describing how 
federal judges have increasingly taken on managerial functions, called for the preservation of 
the “uniqueness of the judicial function”, which involves disinterested and disengaged 
decision-making.20 Resnik and Hensler cautioned against the embracing mediation in lieu of 
                                               
PROCESSES 213, 313, 318 (Aspen, 2007): arbitration referring to a private dispute resolution procedure involving 
arguments submitted to a neutral third party who has power to issue a binding decision; mini-trial involving 
lawyers making summary presentations to a panel comprising a neutral advisor and high-level executives with 
settlement authority, and seeking a prediction of the likely outcome of the matter from the neutral advisor;  and 
early neutral evaluation involving an assessment of a case early in its history by an experienced neutral. 
18  See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Evolution of Mediation in the United States: Issues Ripe for 
Regulation May Shape the Future of Practice, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION 389-390 (Nadja Alexander ed., 
Kluwer Law International 2006) (arguing that the period from mid 1907s to early 1980s was one of 
experimentation, while the second phase occurring a decade later was characterized by a time of rapid 
implementation of mediation programs). 
19 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference 
33 UCLA L.REV. 485, 498 (1985). 
20 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 445 (1982-1983). 
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adjudication, for it represents a shift away from opportunities for the state to regulate conduct 
and to grant normative rights to litigants.21   Furthermore, the US Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were only amended in 1983 to allow judges to discuss settlement during pre-trial 
conference, a likely reflection of a long-held belief that the judge’s primary work is to 
adjudicate.22  
 
Australia’s National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) adopted a 
similar view, remarking that the courts’ specific role within society was to “resolve legal 
disputes according to law”. It quoted former Chief Justice French’s views that the constitutional 
function of the judiciary should not be compromised “by blurring its boundaries with non-
judicial services”. It further argued that judicial time was expensive compared to private 
mediation providers, thus suggesting that judicial mediation did not make the best use of court 
resources.  
 
Other arguments under the divergence approach cast doubt on the ability of judges to mediate 
effectively. NADRAC noted the Victorian bar’s opinion that judges are appointed “not for their 
mediation skills but for their judicial abilities”.23 In the same vein, Alfini seems to doubt the 
innate ability of judges to mediate. He has argued that the experience of judges may lead them 
to adopt an inappropriate “bashing” style, leading to coercive mediation behavior.24 There have 
been numerous other studies in the US suggesting that judges lack the competence to mediate 
without exerting undue pressure. 25  The problem is further exacerbated when judges who 
mediate do not receive any formal training.26  In sum, mediation has been deemed to be 
incongruous with a judge’s conventional functions, thus negating the need for judicial 
mediation.  
 
Conversely, judicial mediation has also been assessed from a congruence approach through the 
lenses of adjudication. Many views along this vein were expressed while the mediation 
                                               
21 Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for Settlement 
J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 168 (2002). 
22 SOURDIN & ZARISKI, supra note 5, at 5. 
23 NATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY COUNCIL (NADRAC), supra note 12, at 110. 
24 James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of Good Mediation? 19 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 47 (1991); James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11,14 (1999).  
25 Brunet, supra note 13 at 254-256 (stating that a judge who mediates typically “appraises the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the parties' cases, presents a rough case evaluation to the parties, and seeks to extract settlement 
offers that mirror the judge's analytical perception of the dispute”); Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1 (2001); James A. Wall Jr. & Dale E. Rude, Judicial Mediation: Techniques, Strategies, and Situational 
Effects 41 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 47 (1985); James A, Wall Jr. & Dale E. Rude, The Judge as a Mediator, 76 J. OF 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 54 (1991); Dale E. Rude & James A Wall Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges 
and Lawyers View It, 72 JUDICATURE 175, 177 (1988) (noting that judges more often prefer to ask both lawyers 
simply to compromise). 
26 John C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to Meet, 21 OHIO. 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 569, 575 (2006); Lawrence E. Susskind, Judicial Dispute Resolution: An Approach 
Evolving to Suit Litigants’ Needs, 20 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 27, 28 (2014) (commenting that is a mistake that the 
judges in Alberta province are not required to receive formal dispute resolution training before undertaking 
judicial dispute resolution responsibilities).  
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movement was increasingly being incorporated into the court process during its golden age. 
From this standpoint, judicial mediation has been depicted as similar to or an extension of the 
adjudication process. Commentators adopting this perspective tend to characterize judicial 
mediation as an evaluative process that resembles a judge’s usual work. For instance, Brunet 
has asserted that the case evaluation – involving the appraisal of the merits of the case –  is the 
very essence of judicial mediation.”27  Brunet also suggests that judicial mediation bears 
similarities with judges signaling their leanings throughout the litigation, which is a natural 
occurrence that cannot be prohibited practically.28 Similarly, NADRAC’s report notes that some 
lawyers were supportive of judges conducting advisory settlement processes but not facilitative 
ones.  These arguments effectively conceptualize judicial mediation in the likeness of the 
adjudication process, instead of a process that differs vastly from decision-making.  
 
Towards Coequality 
The present authors propose a departure from a dichotomous approach that fails to consider the 
changing nature of the justice system across the globe. The arguments leaning on the side of 
divergence tend to portray the courts as synonymous with adjudication alone. Yet this is 
presently not a view that is uniformly held across jurisdictions. Sourdin has observed in this 
regard that several countries’ judges have combined adjudicative, advisory and facilitative 
functions to fit societal and individual needs.29 This combination of functions is, incidentally, 
acceptable in many European and Asian civil law countries which utilize both inquisitorial and 
adversarial processes.30 Even within common law jurisdictions, the roles of the courts and 
judge have not remained static. In this regard, the Canada Law Commission coined the term 
“participatory justice” to emphasize how processes such as mediation seek transformation 
through the active participation of parties involved in the conflict.31 In a similar vein, the 
Australian courts have regarded mediation as an integral part of the courts’ processes, and 
judges in several courts and tribunals have been acting as mediators.32 The changes to the 
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct also reflect these paradigmatic changes; 
                                               
27 Brunet, supra note 13 at 233. 
28 Id, at 254-256. 
29 Tania Sourdin, Five Reasons Why Judges Should Conduct Settlement Conferences 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 146, 
148-149 (2011).  
30 Vietnam’s Code of Civil procedure provides that a judge in a civil case has a duty of conciliation (Articles 10, 
31, 41, 64, 131; 180-188). In Indonesia, Article 130 of the Civil Law Procedure obliges the judges to try the 
amicable settlement before the civil proceeding starts. In France, Article 21 of the New Code of Civil Procedure 
for individual disputes requires that “[i]t shall be part of the duties of the judge to conciliate the parties”. See also 
Archie Zariski, Understanding Judges’ Responses to Judicial Dispute Resolution: A Framework for Comparison, 
in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 59-62 (Sourdin & Zariski eds., 
2013) at 48 (stating that civil law procedures are “judge-centric” compared to common law, and the judges who 
are more accustomed to active involvement in all stages of case may feel more comfortable intervening for the 
purpose of settlement; and that the increase of managerial judging in common law systems represents a 
convergence with civil law).   
31 LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, Transforming Relationships through participatory justice: A report by the Law 
Commission of Canada (Law Commission of Canada 2003).  
32 Sourdin, supra note 29 at 159-160.  
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the commentary to the code encouraged a judge to facilitate settlement, and expressly allowed 
ex parte communications with parties and their lawyers to facilitate settlement.33  
 
In varying degrees, the courts’ interaction with the court users has been shifting from that of a 
detached adjudicator to a more pro-active problem-solver offering a range of dispute resolution 
processes to fit the exact contours of the dispute. Cappelleti and Garth have described this new 
paradigm as “co-existential justice”, in which private dispute resolution processes have an 
expanded role alongside formal public models.34 Accordingly, to move the debate productively, 
the focus should shift towards the coequality and coexistence of facilitative and adjudicatory 
processes within the courts. The clock cannot be turned back; the reality of the changes that 
have occurred within the justice system across many legal traditions cannot be denied. Many 
of the arguments advanced along divergence or congruence lines in the previous decades no 
longer resonate strongly in the current age.  
 
The embracing of mediation should not replace trial adjudication, as Resnik cautioned. 
However, a coequality approach by a judiciary need not, and should not, result in the 
diminution of the role of adjudication. On the contrary, accepting the equal legitimacy of 
different processes has great potential to enhance the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process. 
Landerkin, commenting on the Canadian justice system, has argued that the judges could be 
left to adjudicate only if the adversarial system of justice were running smoothly. However, 
the criticisms of adversarial justice have led to multiple reforms. Landerkin reasoned that the 
“role of a judge primarily predicated on a seriously flawed…approach to justice is surely not 
sustainable”.35 The courts’ encouragement of the use of mediation in appropriate cases while 
allowing others to proceed for a trial is surely a more sustainable way for the justice system to 
be responsive to diverse needs. 
 
Moreover, a coequality approach allows facilitative and adjudicatory processes to co-exist 
within the justice system. If it is acceptable for a judge to take on a variety of roles, there is no 
compelling need to design judicial mediation as a primarily evaluative process, a response 
stemming from the congruence stance. Such an approach risks distorting the common 
understanding of mediation, as well as rendering judicial mediation almost indistinguishable 
from litigation. By contrast, a court’s decision to use judges to engage in facilitative mediation 
helps signify its clear endorsement of mediation as being a different process from adjudication, 
but having equal standing. Wayne Brazil wrote about this legitimizing effect when observing 
how a court using its own full-time employees to serve as ADR neutrals is likely to inspire the 
greatest public confidence that ADR services represent real added value, instead of being a 
poor substitute to adjudication. He astutely observed that “the closer and the more visible the 
                                               
33 Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and Procedural Justice 16 Nev. L.J. 983, 1004-1010 (2015-
2016); Nancy A. Welsh et al, supra note 14 at 59-62; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 19 at 503 (noting that on a 
historical level courts have often done more than adjudicate, but have managed and administered themselves).  
34 Cappelletti, supra note 2 at 287 and 289.  
35 Hugh F. Landerkin & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute 
Resolution in Canada 82 CAN. B. REV. 249, 285 (2003). 
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connection between the Court and its ADR program, the clearer the Court’s signal that it 
identifies with that program – and endorses its value and quality”. 36 It is therefore argued that 
judicial mediation is consonant with a broader concept of justice and an enlarged role for the 
courts to include both facilitative and adjudicative functions. Far from failing to fulfil a 
legitimate need in the justice system, judicial mediation has a potentially substantial 
legitimizing impact on the role of mediation in advancing access to justice within the court 
system.  
 
B. The Inconsistency Debate 
 
Commentators have also debated about the potential benefits of judicial mediation and whether 
such an innovation is worth the investment of court resources. In this respect, trenchant 
criticisms have been levelled against judicial mediation as being inconsistent with mediation 
as well as the traditional justice system. Once again, the arguments have been commonly 
advanced along either a divergence or congruence stance.  
 
Between Divergence and Congruence 
As alluded to earlier, critics taking the divergence approach tend to argue that mediation has to 
be kept distinct from the adjudication process. The greatest misgiving that mediation 
practitioners and scholars have with judicial mediation is its potential inconsistency with a 
central principle of mediation, party autonomy. The literature on judicial mediation has often 
portrayed it as a largely evaluative process involving the judge sharing his or her opinion about 
the merits of the case, a development that has tainted the development of mediation as a 
consensual process.37 Menkel-Meadow has commented that this style may well have departed 
from pure mediation and taken the hybrid form of “med-arb”. Referring to studies showing that 
lawyers want judges to express an analytical opinion, Menkel-Meadow observed that judges 
adopting such styles are not necessarily mediators, as a “mediator facilitates communication 
between the parties and helps them to reach their own solution”. 38 While there are indeed 
studies reflecting lawyers’ general preference for a case evaluation,39 Welsh has highlighted 
how such an approach potentially leads to the disputants feeling coerced into settlement. A 
party may agree to settle out of a fear of reprisal from the judge’s subsequent rulings and 
                                               
36 Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 715, 750 and 753 (1998-1999). 
37 Hensler, supra note 13; Brunet, supra note 13.  
38 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 19, at 510-511.  
39 Wayne Brazil, Settling Civil Cases: Where Attorneys Disagree About Judicial Roles, 23 TRIAL JUDGES J. 20, 
20-24 (1984) (observing that most lawyers surveyed in Northern California preferred judge who would make 
suggestions); Dale E. Rude & James A. Wall Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges and Lawyers 
View It, 72 JUDICATURE 175, 177 (1988) (noting that lawyers surveyed desired judges to indicate show similar 
cases have settled); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L. REV. 473, 
524 (2002) (noting that 87% of the lawyers surveyed wanted the mediator to value a case); Roselle Wissler, Court-
Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 641, 685 (2002) (observing that lawyers found a mediation fairer if the mediator suggested solutions, 
helped the parties in evaluating the merits of their case or assisted them in assessing the value of the case). 
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behavior. Welsh argued that there may be the perception of coercion and a genuine lack of 
self-determination even without the judge’s use of explicit threats.40  
 
Apart from case evaluation, other techniques used in judicial mediation have also been roundly 
criticized as undermining the parties’ self-determination. In the early days of the mediation 
movement, Wall and Rude’s survey of lawyers demonstrated that a significant number of 
heavily utilized settlement techniques were deemed by lawyers as unethical, including talking 
to each lawyer separately about settlement, suggesting a settlement figure to a client and giving 
advice to the lawyer with the weaker case.41 A recent comprehensive review of empirical 
studies shows that “pressing” or “directive” mediation styles that have an element of pressure 
tend to lower party satisfaction levels. 42  In this regard, Robinson observed in a study of 
California judges that many judges who had high settlements rates tend to use directive 
techniques.43  If judicial mediation is largely characterized by directive methods, there is a 
worrying impact on the parties’ exercise of autonomy within mediation. 
 
The risk of coercion is further accentuated when the judge who mediates subsequently presides 
over the trial.  Several studies have demonstrated the danger of this practice. Alfini argued that 
“even the most sensitive judge may initially be perceived by some parties as coercing 
settlement merely by virtue of his or her position as the judge assigned to their case.” 
Reinforcing this conclusion, Wissler’s survey of lawyers showed that settlement conferences 
with judges assigned to the case had a lower average overall lawyers’ preference rating than 
conferences with judges not assigned to the case.44 Furthermore, Welsh has argued that when 
magistrates offer both settlement assistance and adjudication, the parties and lawyers are 
unlikely to perceive that the judge will give trustworthy consideration to their voice or be even-
handed. Procedural justice concerns are at risk of being undermined.45 Evidently, mediator 
                                               
40 Welsh, supra note 25, at 67.  
41 James Wall Jr. et al., Judicial Participation in Settlement, J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 38-39 (1984) (showing how 17 
out of 70 techniques being examined were thought by lawyers to be unethical practices).   
42 American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, Report of the Task Force on Research on Mediator 
Technique 15 (June 12, 2017), referring to studies such as James A. Wall, Jr, Timothy C. Dunne & Suzanne Chan-
Serafin, Judicial Mediation: The Effects of Neutral, Evaluative, and Pressing Mediators Strategies, 29 CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION QUARTERLY 127 (2011).  
43  Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge – Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An Empirical 
Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conferences Practices and Techniques, 33 AMERICAN J. OF TRIAL 
ADVOCACY 113,141-142 (2009). See also Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? – The Need for a Clearer 
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ ST. L.J. 45 (1994); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: 
Is this the End of ‘Good Mediation’? , 19 FLORIDA ST. U. LAW REV. (1991).    
44 Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 271, 285 (2011) (finding that lawyers thought that judges assigned to the cases were 
much less able to fully explore settlement without prejudice to ongoing litigation compared to other types of 
neutral). See also Cratsley, supra note 26; Frank E. A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11 
(1999); Leroy J. Tornquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 743 (1989); Welsh, supra note 33; Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: 
Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 73 (2017) (all articles pointing up the danger of 
coercion and partiality resulting from trial judges being involved in settlements).     
45 Welsh, supra note 33, at 1032-1033.  
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practitioners tend to think that judicial mediation detracts from the consensual basis of 
mediation.   
 
On the other hand, criticisms also abound concerning how judicial mediation is inconsistent 
with due process and other principles of natural justice. These critics adopt the congruence 
approach, focusing on how the process resembles the conventional adjudication process.  In 
this connection, Resnik has expressed grave concern about the constitutionality of judicial 
settlement in the United States context. She observed the growing trend of dispute diffusion, 
in which the courts (and government agencies) have embraced a range of dispute resolution 
options that “clouds the courts’ identity as a unique constitutionally obliged mode of decision 
making”.46 Resnik further argued that the First Amendment doctrine should be shaped “in light 
of commitments that courts function as open, egalitarian venues”, because the public should 
not be excluded from observing how conflicts in democracies are handled. From her 
perspective, the constitutional right of audience should also entail the obligation by the courts 
to public oversight, whether the courts exercise its powers in trials or private resolution of 
claims. She thus proposed that private dispute resolution in the court ought to be accompanied 
by public accountings of what transpired. 47 There is therefore the suggestion that the lack of 
publicity within court mediations, including judicial mediation, breaches constitutional 
obligations.  
 
There have been similar misgivings within Australia. Some have argued that judicial mediation 
is incompatible with the exercise of judicial power in the constitution, though there are also 
dissenting views. Additionally, there is unease with the use of private sessions as being inimical 
to procedural and natural justice.48 Welsh, in assessing magistrates’ settlement practices in the 
US, also sounds caution in relation to the proper use of ex parte communications. Although the 
US Code of Conduct for Judges allows the judge to confer separately with the parties in 
settlement efforts, it also highlights the potential for coercion to occur.49 Welsh argued that 
judges have to be mindful of the impact of private meetings on their appearance of objectivity 
and impartiality, particularly if the same magistrate is handling both the settlement and 
adjudication processes.  
 
Achieving coequality 
It is suggested that the concerns expressed on either the divergence or congruence approach 
ultimately stem from the absence of clarity on the model of judicial mediation being practiced. 
The sheer diversity of judicial settlement practices – ranging from facilitative to “bashing” 
                                               
46 Judith Resnik, Diffusing Dispute: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2806-2807 (2015).  
47 Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s 
Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1984-1686 (2015).  
48 Sourdin, supra note 29, at 160-161. 
49 American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(4) and accompanying commentary 
(stating that a “Judge may encourage and seek to facilitate settlement but should not act in a manner that coerces 
any party into surrendering the right to have the controversy resolved by the courts”).  
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techniques – has clouded the entire concept of judicial mediation. It is presently not evident 
whether judicial mediation is more akin to mediation or to an adjudicatory process. Instead, 
judicial mediation has been practiced as an odd mixture of facilitative and adjudicatory 
techniques, with variations arising from the differing practices across countries and individual 
styles of judges. Consequently, the lack of clarity of judicial mediation has risked discrediting 
both the mediation process and the justice system. Mediators tend to disavow the connection 
between judicial mediation and the facilitative mediation process they know, preferring to label 
the process a settlement conference or even “med-arb”, as Menkel-Meadow put it. On the other 
hand, some judges and commentators have extreme discomfort with infusing the 
conventionally public and adversarial justice system with elements of facilitation and 
confidentiality. It appears as if a merger of the two streams of mediation and adjudication has 
gone awry and failed to benefit either stream.  
 
Nevertheless, it is the present authors’ view that coequality may be achieved within judicial 
mediation. However, such coequality cannot be attained through a mindless mixture of 
facilitative and advisory techniques. Such an approach, far from achieving the best of both 
worlds of mediation and adjudication, taints both processes. It is instead proposed that the 
courts respect the coequality of the different streams of mediation and adjudication. In other 
words, judicial mediation has to be thoughtfully designed to harness the benefits of both 
streams, and yet not muddy the distinction between the different dispute resolution processes.  
 
Can such coequality be achieved in practice? It is argued that it is more than feasible. Such 
coequality requires thoughtful conceptualization of judicial mediation in light of the principles 
underlying both mediation and the adjudication system. First, there has to be clarity about what 
judicial mediation is from the mediation perspective. The present authors have deliberately 
used the term judicial mediation instead of settlement conference to emphasize the crucial need 
to preserve the quintessential principles underlying mediation, chief of which is party 
autonomy. It is undisputed in many jurisdictions’ mediation codes that the key focus of 
mediation is to help the disputants reach their own decision instead of having an outcome 
imposed on them.50  If the practice of judicial mediation casts substantial doubt over the 
disputants’ genuine exercise of autonomy, it is likely such an innovation has done more harm 
than good to the standing of the mediation process.  
 
It is therefore evident that what has been known as muscle mediation and other coercive 
practices should not form part of the practice of judicial mediation. Judges taking on this role 
require the relevant training in mediation, and cannot simply translate an adjudication mindset 
and behavior into a different setting. The gravitas of the judge has to be utilized not to impose 
an outcome (and therefore change the complexion of the process to be more akin to 
adjudication), but to facilitate a consensual settlement. In this regard, Canadian judge 
                                               
50 See e.g., American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association & Association for Conflict Resolution, 
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators § VI.A.9 (2005); ADR Institute of Canada, Code of Conduct § 3 
(2011); Singapore International Mediation Institute, Code of Conduct § 5.9 (2017). 
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Landerkin helpfully stated that judicial mediators have to be competent facilitators, employing 
dialogue as the basic approach, and that at all times the use of judicial clout should not be 
countenanced at all times.51 In the same vein, former Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow in the 
US suggested that magistrates respect the parties’ control of the outcome, protect the 
confidentiality of communications, and encourage creative solutions, advice that Welsh noted 
resembles mediation principles.52  
 
Welsh’s call to guard against the parties’ perception of coercion is also worth paying heed to. 
The Ontario Bar expressed a similar concern when crafting a report evaluating judicial dispute 
resolution. Commenting that judicial gravitas is a double-edged sword, the report stated that a 
judge’s suggestion for settlement can be perceived as coercive even by sophisticated litigants. 
The report thus called for judges to be trained in facilitative techniques.53 Moreover, Otis and 
Reiter, when writing about the Quebec judicial mediation model, emphasized the need for a 
judge-mediator to be trained to “shift gears between adjudication and mediation”, because the 
failure to do so poses “grave threats to the integrity and viability of a voluntary system of 
judicial mediation”. 54  The Quebec judicial mediation system was introduced to shift the 
disputants away from the win-lose equation and from imposed justice in order to address the 
broader conflict between them.55 It was hence crucial to practice judicial mediation in a way 
that brought the benefits of mediation, as opposed to adjudication. In this regard, Roberge’s 
survey concerning Quebec’s system showed that the parties and lawyers identified the greatest 
strength of the process as the interpersonal treatment by the judges. Roberge argued that this 
finding confirmed the wisdom of choosing a facilitative approach.56  
 
However, it may be argued that such a model of judicial mediation is indistinguishable from 
other types of mediation, and there is thus no added benefit in having a judge perform the role 
of a mediator. Nevertheless, it is argued that there are valuable benefits, one of which is the 
potentially substantial gains in procedural justice arising from the stark reversal of the judge’s 
                                               
51 Landerkin & Pirie, supra note 35, at 252. 
52 Welsh, supra note 33, at 1020-1021, referring to Morton Denlow, Settlement Conference Techniques: Caucus 
Dos and Don’ts, JUDGES J. 21, 23 (2010); and at 995, referring to Aaron E. Goodstein, The Expanding Role of 
Magistrate Judges: One District’s Experience, FED. LAW. May/June 2014, at 78. 
53 The Ontario Bar Association Judicial Mediation Taskforce, A Different ‘Day in Court’: The Role of the 
Judiciary in Facilitating Settlements, Report of the Taskforce (July 2013), 
http://www.oba.org/en/pdf/aDifferentDayInCourt7122013.pdf, at 16. 
54 Otis & Reiter, supra note 15, at 367.  
55 Id, at 363; See generally JEAN-FRANÇOIS ROBERGE, PARTICIPATORY JUSTICE. FUNDAMENTALS AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK (Yvon Blais, Thomson Reuters ed. 2017) (In French); Suzanne Courteau, “Settlement Conference”, 
in DEALING WITH DISPUTES IN A DIFFERENT WAY (Pierre-Claude Lafond ed., Lexis Nexis 2015) (In French) ; Jean-
François Roberge, "Settlement Conference : between judicial and problem-solving reasoning" 3(1) REVUE DE 
PRÉVENTION ET RÈGLEMENT DES DIFFÉRENDS 25 (2005) (In French) ; Quebec, Code of Civil Procedure R.S.Q., C-
25 (Can.), article 161(“Presiding over settlement conferences falls within the conciliation mission of judges.”), 
article 162 (“The purpose of a settlement conference is to facilitate dialogue between the parties to help them 
better understand and assess their respective needs, interests and positions, and explore solutions that may lead to 
a mutually satisfactory agreement to resolve the dispute.”), and article 163 (“A settlement conference is held in 
the presence of the parties, and, if the parties so wish, in the presence of their lawyers. It is held in camera, at no 
cost to the parties and without formality”.) 
56 Roberge, supra note 6, at 352-353. 
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conventional role. The judge, who is usually the adjudicator, now adopts radically different 
behavior as a mediator who listens and shows understanding for the individual’s concerns 
without passing judgment. There is huge satisfaction for the parties when the judge, who is 
thought to embody the authority of the judicial system, is willing to listen to each party, explore 
their underlying concerns, and reflect an accurate understanding of their circumstances and 
emotions. This surprising reversal of the conventionally authoritative figure’s behavior can 
have a favorable impact on the mediation. Parties who are given an opportunity to present their 
stories to the judge mediator potentially experience a greater sense of voice due to their 
concerns being heard by a representative of the judicial system. 57 It has also been observed 
that this process effectively extinguishes a party’s desire to seek adjudication by trial, since the 
process of “telling it to a judge” has fulfilled the person’s need for a “day in court”. 58 The 
potential for a facilitative judicial mediation model to advance perceptions of procedural justice 
cannot be underestimated.  
  
It has been argued above that judicial mediation be carefully conceptualized in light of the 
principles underlying the justice system and mediation. There remains the question of how a 
facilitative judicial mediation model also leverages on the judge’s legal expertise and 
experience in a way that is compatible with the justice system. Several studies have indicated 
lawyers’ general preferences for mediators to give opinions on the merits of the case. Brazil’s 
study showed that a large majority of Northern California lawyers preferred judges who made 
suggestions during settlement conferences.59 Nonetheless, Welsh has also pointed out that 
other studies show how lawyers appreciated judicial signaling and assisting them to be realistic 
in the application of law, but did not like judges to evaluate the matter in the presence of clients 
or to emphasize the high risk of going for a trial.60 As such, the standing and experience of a 
judge is certainly useful in assisting parties in reality testing, but such reality testing has to be 
done sensitively.  
                                               
57 Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magistrates as Mediators 73 NEB. 
L. REV. 712, 732 (1994) (noting one magistrate’s view of the cathartic effect of the judge’s presence arising from 
a judge allowing the parties time to express their views and feelings. “Having a judge listen and show 
understanding for the litigant’s concerns, without passing judgment, is often more important than adding an extra 
twenty percent to the settlement figure.”); Lucy K. Katz, The L’Ambiance Plaza Mediation: A Case Study in 
Judicial Settlement of Mass Torts, 5 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 227, 307(1990)  (noting from a case study that the 
parties felt almost as if they “had their day in court” when they had the opportunity to present their stories to a 
judge-mediator. The mediation proceedings seem to replicate the due process that they would have expected from 
a trial. She quotes one magistrate as saying, “[A judge] can, in effect, give the litigants their day in court, i.e. a 
chance to tell their side of the story and to release their frustrations to a representative of the judicial branch. Such 
a ‘day in court’ may be the only thing a litigant needs to be sufficiently “emotionally cleared” to begin constructive 
settlement negotiations.”) See also Michael Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the Parties to 
Decide Through Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 429, 445-446 (1991) (observing that there is a catharsis 
when a judge is able to listen and show understanding of the litigants’ concerns). 
58 The Ontario Bar Association Judicial Mediation Taskforce, supra note 53, at 15 (observing that for those who 
are alienated from the court system, judicial mediation can be, in their minds, their “day in court”, which is 
expressly colloquially as the parties’ desire to “tell it to a judge”). See also SOURDIN & ZARISKI, supra note 5, at 
8 (stating that a judge may be well placed to supervise procedural aspects of the process and to accord litigants 
the respect and attention that they expect from a “day in court”).  
59 Brazil, supra note 36.  
60 Welsh, supra note 33 at 1008-1009.   
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Court-connected mediation invariably involves negotiation in the shadow of the law, and the 
disputants will be concerned about their prospects of success at a trial. Otis and Reiter have 
observed that the Quebec judges’ knowledge of the legal issues enables them to cogently help 
the parties focus on the issues underlying the dispute and to bring them to the fore of the 
discussions, even if the mediator stops short of explicitly expressing an opinion on the merits.61 
This “deflation effect” on overly optimistic or unrealistic disputants can help to effectively 
break impasses in the negotiations.62 In addition, the judicial mediation process has great 
potential for lawyers’ face-saving purposes.63 When facing the judge mediator, they are able 
to provide their honest opinion of the client’s prospects of success without appearing to be 
unduly weak before their clients. In sum, it is suggested that the judge’s standing and expertise 
offer substantial benefits to the mediation process, but should be used in a predominantly 
facilitative manner because of the huge likelihood of the perception of coercion. If parties wish 
to have a largely advisory process, it is more advisable to term it an early neutral evaluation or 
a mini-trial. Transparency of the purpose of the judicial mediation process is vital to ensure 
that both the mediation process and the justice system are not discredited.  
 
In order for coequality to be achieved, judicial mediation also has to be compatible with other 
aspects of the overall justice system. There are varying views across different jurisdictions on 
whether judicial mediation is a constitutional practice. While some maintain that it is an 
exercise of non-judicial power which is incompatible with the separation of powers or the 
court’s conventional role, others take the view that there are no impediments to superior courts 
adopting the practice. Even if there are doubts, appropriate empowering legislation could be 
enacted.  
 
The more difficult issue pertains to maintaining the perception of impartiality of the judiciary. 
It is therefore unsurprising that a large body of studies have criticized the practice of trial judges 
mediating the cases assigned to them. The likelihood of confidential communications revealed 
in mediation being used by the trial judge is undoubtedly high, and will tend to decrease the 
parties’ trust in the legitimacy of the process and increase the probability of the perception of 
coercion.64 This dangerous impact on parties’ perceptions and on the judge’s objectivity during 
the trial has been highlighted in the ABA Model Code.65 As will be explained further in the 
article, a model of judicial mediation that inspires public confidence should therefore have a 
clear separation between the roles of the judicial mediator and the trial judge.  
 
Finally, there have been suggestions that the prominence of confidentiality and the lack of 
                                               
61 Otis & Reiter, supra note 15 at 366. 
62 Longan, supra note 57 at 739-74. 
63 Brazil, supra note 39 at 23 (highlighting that the lawyer can escape his stereotypical role in judicial settlement 
conferences and recommend compromise based on the judge’s suggestion, thus avoiding the loss of standing in 
his client’s and opponent’s eyes). See also Longan, supra note 57 at 742. 
64 James Wall Jr. et al., supra note 41.  
65 Welsh, supra note 33 at 1006. 
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public oversight within mediation militate against the principles of due process and 
transparency. It is argued that confidentiality of the process per se does not infringe 
fundamental principles of natural justice. The lack of publicity of mediation as contrasted to a 
trial is a significant feature rendering it an attractive dispute resolution process. As judges get 
increasingly involved in case management activities behind closed doors, judicial mediation is 
not such an anomalous development. The more salient question is how to ensure accountability 
of judicial mediators, so that confidentiality does not become a cloak for unchecked abuses to 
take place. This is a valid concern as even private mediators are subject to ethical obligations, 
regulation and disciplinary procedures. Measures to increase transparency, accountability and 
trust within judicial mediation will therefore be proposed in the subsequent section.  
 
In sum, the distinctions and similarities of judicial mediation with adjudication have been 
analyzed extensively by renowned academics and experienced practitioners. However, the 
preoccupation with defining judicial mediation solely from the mediation perspective or the 
adjudication lenses has not led to beneficial innovations to either process. Notwithstanding 
their value, the divergence and congruence approaches on judicial mediation have reached their 
limits for public regulators, judicial administrators and judges who want to go further in their 
reflection and practices. A coequality approach is needed to pave the way forward. Judicial 
mediation can be designed in a way that respects the fundamental principles underlying the 
unique streams of mediation and adjudication. In the next section, we propose a renewed model 
that departs from a dichotomous stance. 
 
2. Renewal of Judicial Mediation - Towards Coequality 
 
 
As demonstrated in section 1, judicial mediation has been the subject of debates about how its 
potentials and pitfalls balance the “scale of justice”. We believe a more promising way is 
needed to bring forward the state of knowledge in the judicial dispute resolution field and this 
is where our paper can be useful. In this second section, we argue that the time has come to 
explore coequality, reached by respecting the equivalence of mediation and litigation in 
providing justice and harnessing their best qualities towards a renewed theoretical model.  
 
We propose the “Integrative Judicial Mediation” (IJUM) framework to create the next 
generation of judicial mediation. This model has been built in line with the emerging user-
centric vision of access to justice that is shared by both Singapore and Canada amongst others66. 
                                               
66 For an overview of a user-centric vision of access to justice in Canada, see Action Committee on Access to 
Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Canadian Access to Justice Initiatives: Justice Development Goal Status 
Report (2017); Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Access to Civil and Family 
Justice: A Roadmap for Change (2013); Canadian Bar Association, Reaching Equal Justice. An invitation to 
envision and act (2013); Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project, Listening to Ontarian Report (2010). For an overview 
in Singapore, see Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Mediation and the Rule of Law, Keynote Address, The Law 
Society Mediation Forum (10 March 2017), 
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We developed the model to fit within a judicial system that pursues access to justice through 
achieving the dual goals of efficiency and quality of justice67. By efficiency, we refer to how a 
litigant experiences the judicial process, from the initial procedure to the execution of a 
judgment, in terms of the value resulting from the resources invested (time, money, removal of 
psychological impediments, etc.). By quality, we refer to procedural fairness (quality of 
participation, information, interpersonal treatment, etc.) and substantive justice (quality of 
results in terms of compensation, functionality and transparency, etc.) experienced within 
dispute resolution processes connected to the judicial system. Our ambition is to create a 
framework of essential characteristics for designing the next generation of judicial mediation. 
While the model ultimately has to be adapted to different cultural and socio-legal contexts, it 
is proposed that most jurisdictions would share the twin goals of efficiency and quality of 
justice. The IJUM model has been designed to advance these specific aims and will thus be 
beneficial to different judiciaries.   
 
The model has been created through an “Integrative Thinking” methodology 68 . Using 
abductive logic 69  and assertive inquiry 70 , we analyzed the elements of Singapore’s and 
Canada’s judicial mediation programs and their underlying rationales. We explored the 
literature and training materials for judges, and took into consideration speeches from judicial 
                                               
http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/Data/Editor/Documents/Keynote%20Address%20-%20Mediation%20and%20
the%20Rule%20of%20Law%20(Final%20edition%20after%20delivery%20-%20090317).pdf, at paras 14, 15; 
Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, The Common Law Litigation Process: Time for a Rethink? The Australian 
Academy of Law Patron’s Address in Sydney (23 October 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/media-room/aal-address---the-common-law-litigation-process---time-for-a-
rethink-on-23-october-2014-(final-edition---281014).pdf, at para 61; Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Address at 
the Joint Launch of the State Courts Centre for Dispute Resolution and “Mediation in Singapore: A Practical 
Guide, a publication by Thomson Reuters (4 March 2015) 
https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/Lawyer/Documents/State%20Courts%20-%20Launch%20of%20State%20Court
s%20Centre%20for%20Dispute%20Resolution%20Speech%20on%204%20March%202015.pdf, at para 5. 
67 Efficiency and quality of judicial processes, including alternative dispute resolution, are criteria measured in 
international benchmark tools like the Rule of Law Index conducted by the World Justice Project under the “civil 
justice” factor and the Doing Business report conducted by the World Bank under the "ease of enforcing contracts" 
indicator. See generally World Justice Project, supra note 2; World Bank,  Doing Business – Measuring Business 
Regulations (2016), http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/enforcing-contracts. 
68 ROGER MARTIN, THE OPPOSABLE MIND, WINNING THROUGH INTEGRATIVE THINKING 15 (Harvard Business 
Press, 2009) at 15, (integrative thinking can be defined as “the ability to face constructively the tension of opposing 
models and instead of choosing one at the expense of the other, generate a creative resolution of the tension in the 
form of a new ideas that contains elements of the individual ideas but is superior to each.”); See also Elizabeth 
Ruth Wilson & Leigh L. Thompson, Creativity and negotiation research: the integrative potential 25-4 INT'L J. 
CONFL. MGMT. 359 (2014). 
69 MARTIN, supra note 68 at 146 (abductive logic can be defined as an inference to the best explanation when 
faced with incomplete, new or interesting data that does not fit with existing models. It is modal reasoning It uses 
logic to inquire into what could possibly be true. Abductive reasoning is the logic of what might be, in ther words, 
what could possibly be true. It is different from deductive reasoning that is the logic of what must be (from the 
general to the particular) and from inductive reasoning that is the logic of what is operative (from detailed facts 
to general principles). Deductive and inductive are declarative reasonings with the objective to determine the truth 
or falsity of a given proposition.).   
70  Id, at 156-157 (assertive inquiry can be defined as a mode of communication that combines the explicit 
expression of one’s own model with the sincere exploration of the other’s model, with the aim of producing 
meaningful dialogue and increased understanding. It seeks common ground between conflicting models. It is 
different from advocacy, where we communicate in an argumentative way to explain our model to others and 
defend it from criticism.). 
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officials as well as regulations relevant to judicial mediation. Assuming an “optimistic model 
seeking” approach71, we identified “leverage points”72 from each country’s model, in order to 
discuss what “might be” the elements of an optimal judicial mediation program that effectively 
enhances access to justice. It is evident that Singapore and Canada have complementary 
strengths that could bring opportunities for a renewed model. We thus identified five leverage 
points which became the elements of our proposed IJUM model: (a) sense of access to justice 
assessment (b) procedural values, (c) ethical accountability, (d) process harmonization, and (e) 
training and specialization (see figure 1). The next sections will be dedicated to these 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Integrative Judicial Mediation model (IJUM).  
 
 
A.  “Sense of Access to Justice” Assessment  
 
                                               
71 Id. at 126-129. (optimist model seekers “see the value in the complexity of multiple models, and their preference 
is always to wait for a better model to emerge rather than to justify the existing model.” They don’t believe there 
is a right answer, just the best available now. “In essence, the stance can be characterized as optimistic because it 
implies optimism that future models will be superior to the current model.” In contrast, contented model defenders 
see the value in certainty and accumulate data in support of the theory they have adopted to confirm and defend 
existing models.)      
72 Id, at 123-124. See also Rotman Executive program. Rotman Integrative Thinking program. (Toronto, October 
2011) (a leverage point is "a component of a model – part of the supporting logic, an assumption, a logical link – 
that provides a unique insight to the problem and, when challenged or extended, opens up new possibilities for a 
solution." It provides an opportunity).  
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Process	harmonization:	Preparation	and	
Opening,		Facts	and	perceptions,	Interests	and	
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follow-up
Training	and	Specialization:	Communication,	
value	assessment,	trust	building	and	facilitated	
negotiation	knowledge	and	skills
1
Integrative Judicial Mediation model	(IJUM)
Quek Anderson,	Roberge	2018
Jean-François Roberge & Dorcas Quek Anderson, Judicial Mediation: From Debates to 
Renewal (2018) 19(3) CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL 613 
Draft version. For finalised published version, refer to journal website. 
 
 21 
Following the user-centric trend to improve access to justice, we argue that the litigants’ 
perspectives should be at the heart of a renewed model for judicial mediation. We suggest that 
it is the prerogative of litigants to assess the quality and efficiency of judicial mediation or any 
dispute resolution methods and to make an informed decision on what seems an appropriate 
way to obtain justice for them. This approach follows from a coequality perspective that 
respects the use of both mediation and adjudication as equally legitimate ways to achieve 
access to justice. Instead of denigrating one process over the other, the coequality stance seeks 
to understand the litigant’s perceptions on how judicial mediation should be conducted in a 
way that harnesses the best qualities of mediation and the conventional justice system.  This 
approach is consistent with the recent worldwide trend towards the use of “access to justice 
metrics” in order to build an evidence-based approach to support reform and continuous 
improvement of the justice system73. Quantifiable measures of activities and performance that 
can be combined in an index serve many purposes, such as enabling comparison, enhancing 
litigants’ choices, increasing transparency in the delivery of judicial services and creating 
benchmarks and incentives for improving access to justice74. Since public accountability is a 
key principle in every justice system, we believe there should be measures to introduce 
oversight and accountability to the confidential judicial mediation process and to facilitate its 
continuous improvement. Measurement tools have been developed over time75, and consistent 
with the user-centric approach in our paper, we suggest designing as well as monitoring judicial 
mediation through the litigants’ perceptions, or what we term as their “sense of access to justice” 
experience.  
 
Developed and empirically tested in the Canadian context, the “Sense of Access to Justice 
Index” (iSAJ) measures the litigant’s experience of the quality and efficiency of judicial 
mediation services76. Sense of Access to Justice (iSAJ) is a combination of the user’s three 
                                               
73 For international comparative studies, see World Justice Project, supra note 2 ; World Bank, supra note 67 ; 
Hague Model Measuring Access to Justice project (“MA2J”) (2010) 
http://www.hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/HiiL_final_report_Measuring_260410_DEF.pdf. For national 
access to justice metrics metrics studies: in USA, see The National Center for Access to Justice by Fordham Law 
School, Justice Index (“NCAJ”) (2016), http://justiceindex.org; in Australia, see The Access to Justice and Legal 
Needs Program (“A2JLN”), 
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/app/54A6A9F9FFD485F0CA25746400187A24.html; and in Canada, see 
The Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, Cost of Civil Justice Project, http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/cost-of-justice. 
74 See generally Canadian Bar Association, Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act (2013) 
144-146, http://www.cba.org/cba/equaljustice/secure_pdf/Equal-Justice-Report-eng.pdf.; Canadian Bar 
Association, Access to Justice Metrics. A Discussion Paper Envisioning Equal Justice Project, (2013), 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/Access/PDF/Access_to_Justice_Metrics.pdf.  
75 See e.g. Nancy Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement and Procedural Justice, 16 Nev. L.J. 983, 1046 (enclosing 
a suggested questionnaire courts can use) and at 1040-1044 (arguing court surveys helps understand whether court 
practices result in positive perceptions of substantive and procedural justice and encourage regular evaluation to 
assess whether court programs are consistent with the goals set out); COURTOOLS, providing basic indicators 
of court performance, at http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures/Reports-from-Courts.aspx. 
(many states used and adapted Courtools empirical measurement instruments (Statewide reports from California, 
Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Utah, Wisconsin). 
76 The SAJ index has been tested with user’s of judicial mediation at trial courts in Quebec in 2013-2014. A total 
of 740 participants, 51% were litigants and 49% were lawyers, answered the self-administered questionnaire. 
Overall sense of access to justice reported by user’s is 83 out of a possible score of 100. They scored fairness of 
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assessments : (1) sense of fairness, (2) sense of usefulness, and (3) sense of professional support. 
Sense of fairness is measured through the user’s satisfaction with quality of process and results. 
Process corresponds to participatory qualities (voice, consideration, implication) experienced 
by the user as well as the quality of information exchanged (transparent and unbiased) and 
interpersonal treatment (respect and dignity). The outcome of the dispute resolution process is 
assessed through restorative (for the past) and functional (for present and future) qualities of 
the solution achieved in mediation as well as the transparency of criteria (equality, merit or 
needs’ based) supporting it.  Sense of usefulness experienced by users is a measure of the 
perceived value-ratio of economic advantage (money worth, investment payoff, etc.), 
psychological well-being (stress, emotional factor, peace of mind, etc.) and reputational capital 
(network and relationships related). Finally, sense of professional support corresponds to 
user’s perceived quality and efficiency of the judge mediator’s performance in terms of risk 
management (legal expertise, law related), as well as problem solving (communication and 
negotiation expertise, interest-based), and justice facilitation (cooperation building expertise, 
fairness based) approaches. In summary, iSAJ provides a measure of “experienced justice” in 
terms of quality and efficiency of judicial mediation process, as well as its outcome and the 
support received from the judge mediator.   
 
 
Sense of  
Access to Justice  
User’s assessment on the quality and efficiency of judicial 
mediation 
Sense of Fairness Process: (1) Participatory, (2) Informational, (3) Interpersonal 
treatment; 
Results: (4) Restorative, (5) Functional, (6) Transparent and 
principle-based  
Sense of Usefulness Value-ratio in terms of (7) economic advantage, (8) psychological 
well-being, (9) reputational capital 
Sense of 
Professional support  
Support from the mediator in the role of (10) risk manager, (11) 
problem-solver, (12) justice facilitator 
 
Table 1. Sense of Access to Justice assessment by litigants participating in a judicial mediation  
 
 
B.  Procedural Values  
 
Designing judicial mediation to enhance access to justice begs the fundamental question of 
which values are guiding the judge mediator’s interventions. As argued earlier, a coequality 
approach to judicial mediation will not distort the foundational principles of mediation, 
                                               
the process experienced and results to a level of 71%. Efficiency has been score as useful to a level of 88% in 
terms of cost-benefit value. Support received from the judge mediator was evaluated at a quality rate of 89%. 
Each were given an equal weight to calculate overall SAJ. To learn more about the study, its methodology and 
results, see Roberge, supra note 6.  
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particularly the value of party self-determination. Procedural justice is greatly enhanced when 
the judge mediator respects and supports the parties’ exercise of self-determination and gives 
them the opportunity to voice their concerns. As such, we believe that judicial mediation should 
be conducted according to five core process values: (1) respect, (2) self-determination, (3) 
fairness, (4) integrity, and (5) problem solving (see table 2). This framework is based on the 
Singapore State Courts’ “Code of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation”77. Similar 
values can also be found in the Canadian context where the prevention and resolution of 
disputes should be achieved through “fair-minded processes that encourage the persons 
involved to play an active role”78. Collectively, these values are consistent with the central 
tenet of party self-determination within mediation.  An articulation of these core principles also 
has the potential to harmonize practices amongst mediators and bring predictability to this 
judicial service.  
  
 
Core process values Role of mediators 
Respect Listening to parties’ views in a non-judgmental way, understanding 
their concerns and taking them into consideration.  
Self-determination Expanding each individual’s capacity to exercise freedom of choice 
and action.  
Honoring their right to decide. 
Fairness Providing a fair, balanced and non-adversarial process. 
Integrity Encouraging transparency and honesty in information exchange. 
Problem Solving Facilitating holistic and effective solutions. 
 
Table 2. Core process values and roles of mediators.  
 
These procedural values act as safeguards and prevent potential pitfalls identified previously, 
including the likely role confusion between a trial judge and a mediator judge that could lead 
to coercive judicial opinions or undue pressure to settle. Such partiality would be an 
impediment to party self-determination and could shift the balance in favor of one party at the 
expense of the other. Fairness concerns arising from power imbalances under the supervision 
of a mediator are even more worrying in the context of a confidential procedure. As such, the 
mediator – particularly the judicial mediator – is under the duty to preserve the quality of the 
process by conducting the process according to these core values. Conducting a problem-
                                               
77 State Courts of Singapore, Code of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation, supra note 16, at Article 2.  
78 Quebec, Code of Civil Procedure R.S.Q., C-25 (Can.), preliminary provision. See also Quebec, Code of Civil 
Procedure R.S.Q., C-25 (Can.), Article162; Alberta, A.R. 124/2010; British Columbia, B.C.R. 168/2009 Supreme 
Court Civil Rules; Manitoba, Man. R. 553/88 Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, articles 20A(6) to 20A(23); New 
Brunswick, NB Reg. 82-73, Rules 50.07 to 50.15; Newfoundland and Labrador, SNL 1986, c42, (Can.); Nova 
Scotia, NS Reg. 420/2008, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 10.01 and 10.11-10.16; Ontario, Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg. 194, article 50; Prince Edward Island, adopted Ontario’s Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Saskatchewan Queens Bench Rules, Sask Gaz Dec. 27, 2013, 2684, July 1, 2013, Rule 191. 
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solving process with fairness, respect and integrity should positively influence the participant’s 
quality of participation and their sense of empowerment.  
 
 
C.  Ethical Accountability  
 
Apart from respecting the underlying philosophy of mediation, a coequality approach to 
judicial mediation should also respect the crucial values of the judicial system, including the 
need for accountability and due process. Most of the misgivings about judicial mediation stem 
from concerns that the mediation takes place behind closed doors without the benefit of public 
accountability that is expected of a judicial system. It is therefore argued that a judicial 
mediation system has to be governed by clear ethical obligations that are made known to the 
public. We suggest a framework that is consistent with judicial functions as well as the 
mediator’s role in resolving disputes. As such, we believe judicial mediators should be bound 
by four ethical duties: (1) good faith, (2) impartiality, (3) confidentiality, and (4) informed 
consent (see table 3). This is the orientation chosen by Singapore via the State Courts’ “Code 
of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation”79 and it is also consistent with the Canadian 
Judicial Council’s “Ethical principles for judges” 80 . The ethical duties we suggest are 
consistently found in mediation associations’ codes of conduct worldwide81 and implemented 
in model laws on mediation or national laws 82,  like for instance the provisions of the Quebec 
                                               
79 State Courts of Singapore, Code of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation, supra note 16. 
80 In the Canadian context, judges performing mediation are bound by principles of independence, integrity, 
diligence, equality and impartiality. See Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges, https://www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf. No specific adaptations of these ethical 
principles to judicial mediation have been developed so far, although there is literature exploring this topic. See 
Georgina Jackson, The Mystery of Judicial Ethics: Deciphering the ‘Code’ 68 SASK. L. REV. 1 (2005); Keet & 
Cotter, supra note 15; Louise Otis & Catherine Rousseau Saine, The Mediator and Ethical Dilemmas: A Proposed 
Framework for Reflection 4(2) J. OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION, 43 (2014); Michaela Keet, Informed 
Decision-Making in Judicial Mediation and the Assessment of Litigation Risk, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
(forthcoming).  
81 See NADJA ALEXANDER, FATMA IBRAHIM, JEAN-FRANÇOIS ROBERGE, MEDIATION ESSENTIALS 55-63 (World 
Bank 2017); Shapira 2012, supra note 7; Stulberg, supra note 7. See  the following ethical code of conduct : 
Institut d’Arbitrage et de Médiation du Canada (IMAC), National Mediation Rules and Code of Conduct for 
Mediators (2012), http://adric.ca/pdf/ADRMEDIATIONRULES2014.pdf.; Institut de Médiation et d’Arbitrage 
du Québec (IMAQ), Code d’éthique des médiateurs (2007), http://imaq.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Code-
ethique-des-mediateurs19-avril-2007.pdf.; American Bar Association & American Arbitration Association & 
Association for Conflict Resolution (ABA), Model Standards of Conduct, (2005), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/model_standards_of_conflict.cfm#LinkTarget_391.; JAMS, Mediator Ethics 
Guidelines, https://www.jamsadr.com/mediators-ethics.; International Mediation Institute, Code of Professional 
Conduct, https://www.imimediation.org/imi-code-of-professional-conduct.; Australian National Mediator 
Standards, Practice Standards (2007), https://msb.org.au/themes/msb/assets/documents/national-mediator-
accrediation-system-2015.pdf#page=3. ; Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR - UK), Code of Conduct 
for Third Party Neutrals, https://www.cedr.com/about_us/modeldocs/?id=4.; Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Center (HKIAC), General Ethical Code, http://www.hkiac.org/mediation/rules/general-ethical-code.  
82 For model laws, see United Nations Commission on International trade Law (UNCITRAL) Conciliation Rules, 
Resolution 35/52 (December 1981); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with 
Guide To Enactment and Use, Resolution 57/18 (November 2002); Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa (OHADA) Uniform Mediation Act (November 2017). For an overview of national laws 
on mediation, see generally MANON SCHONEWILLE & FRED SCHONEWILLE (eds.) THE VARIEGATED LANDSCAPE 
OF MEDIATION. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MEDIATION REGULATION AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
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Code of Civil procedure related to the “Principles of Procedure applicable to private dispute 
prevention and resolution processes”83. 
 
 
Ethical obligations Commitments of mediators 
Good faith Promoting mutual respect, honesty and trust among all parties.  
Not advancing his/her own interests at the expense of the parties.   
Impartiality Assisting all parties, providing equivalent support and encouraging 
collaboration.  
Disclosing actual or potential conflict of interest. 
Avoiding the use of any language or conduct that gives the 
appearance of partiality.   
Confidentiality Respecting the privacy of parties.  
Preserving the confidentiality of anything said, written or done 
during the process.  
Informed consent Respecting the parties’ right to decide whether and how to settle the 
case. Refraining from language or conduct that puts undue influence 
on parties to settle according to mediator’s suggestion or direction.    
 
Table 3. Ethical obligations and commitments of mediators  
 
Ensuring the ethical accountability of mediators addresses the critics on the risk of denying the 
litigant’s rights behind closed doors as a result of power imbalances. Under our suggested 
framework, a mediator has the ethical duty to facilitate unbiased exchange of information 
between the parties and ensure that the parties’ settlement is based on informed consent. 
Furthermore, the impartial mediator must be careful not to give any impression that the matter 
is to be settled according to his or her views or to give any impression of bias.84 The mediators 
are “not to direct, coerce, push parties to change their minds even if they personally believe 
that the parties’ choice is not right or beneficial”.85 The judge’s gravitas cannot be used in 
a coercive way when courts publicly commit that mediations are conducted under such ethical 
principles. This public commitment towards accountability increases trust in the mediators and 
brings credibility to the judicial mediation program.  
 
 
                                               
(Eleven International publishing 2014); KLAUS J. HOPT & FELIX STEFFEK (eds.), MEDIATION. PRINCIPLES AND 
REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Oxford University Press 2012); FELIX STEFFEK & HANNES 
UNBERATH (eds.), REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS (Hart 
Publishing 2013). 
83 Quebec, Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., C-25 (Can.), Articles 1 to 7. 
84 State Courts of Singapore, Code of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation, supra note 16, paras 3.4.3 
and 4.1(c). 
85 Id., para 4.1(a). 
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D.  Process Harmonization  
 
As alluded to above, the confusion over judicial mediation practices is rooted in the woeful 
lack of clarity about acceptable judicial mediation practices. Consequently, there has often been 
a haphazard combination of facilitative and advisory techniques that has severely tainted both 
the mediation process and the judicial system. Leaving the court’s mediation program to be 
characterized by individual judges’ styles is highly risky. A judicial mediation system that 
inspires confidence requires much greater clarity and consistency amongst judges as to how 
the process should be conducted in a way that is compatible with mediation principles and due 
process. It is thus argued that a process framework largely premised on a facilitative mediation 
model should be used for training and continual monitoring of judges involved in judicial 
mediation. We encourage judicial mediators to harmonize their practice around a five-step 
process: (1) preparation and opening, (2) communicating facts and perceptions, (3) exploring 
interests and priorities, (4) developing options and crafting solutions, and (5) closing and 
follow-up (see table 4). Our framework is based on materials used in judicial mediation training 
programs delivered in Canada86. This process has the advantage of being structured enough to 
provide predictability of process for litigants, as well as being flexible enough to respect party 
self-determination and to provide the latitude for tailor-made solutions consistent with a user-
centric vision of access to justice.   
 
 
Problem solving 
process  
Role of mediators 
Preparation and 
Opening 
Set rules to create a respectful environment and bring parties to a 
problem-solving mindset. 
Communicating facts 
and perceptions 
Provide a safe environment to explore facts and account of 
experiences.  
Establish a dialogue for mutual understanding and trust. 
Exploring interests 
and priorities  
Narrow down the problem from facts to interests and priorities. 
Converge to common ground. 
Developing options 
and crafting solutions 
Reframe positions as options that meet interests/priorities. Redirect 
criticism toward development of new option. Sustain settlement 
discussions leading to a fair outcome chosen by parties.  
Closing and follow-
up 
Canvass agreement to make it enforceable. When there is no 
agreement, assess where barriers lie and suggest strategies to 
overcome them. 
 
Table 4. Problem solving process and role of mediators.  
 
                                               
86 National Judicial Institute, Judicial Settlement Conference, Training program delivered to Quebec Judges 
(Montreal, September 2016); National Judicial Institute, Judicial Settlement Conference: Clinics, Training 
program delivered to Canadian Judges (Toronto, May 2017).  
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The overarching emphasis of the five-step process is on encouraging collaborative problem-
solving in a non-adversarial and unbiased way, and facilitating settlements based on the parties’ 
interests. To this end, there is a preference to use joint sessions to involve lawyers and their 
clients in forming solutions together. Even when caucuses are called, the mediator has to 
involve all the lawyers in the creation of options.87 The mediator ought to “cast the conflict as 
a problem to be solved by all the parties, lawyers and mediator jointly, instead of a contest 
between parties represented by their lawyers”.88  
 
A recurrent concern in debates about judicial mediation is whether and how a “legal opinion” 
be given to litigants. We suggest leaving this role to lawyers assisting their clients given our 
interest-based orientation. If the parties cannot afford a lawyer, a mediator could refer them to 
legal pro bono services that are existent in many jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the probable 
outcome at the trial is certainly a relevant factor for litigants to assess their alternative to a 
settlement. Therefore we understand the usefulness of “a reality-check” in the mediation 
process. Without positioning himself on the probable outcome of a case, risking perceived 
coercion given the judge’s gravitas, the judge mediator may still explore the conditions 
necessary for litigants to reverse the burden of proof. Asking questions is a better option than 
taking a firm position so as to respect party autonomy and lead to the same “reality-check” 
results. Refraining from giving an opinion, even if merely preliminary, is respectful of the 
integrity of the judicial system because any proper judicial decision must result from an 
adversarial process where evidence rules have been respected. Not providing legal opinions 
appears to be the best way for mediators to act consistently with the fundamental values of the 
judicial system.   
 
As highlighted in the earlier section, informal justice has sometimes been criticized as not 
providing parties with procedural safeguards comparable to the formal procedure within the 
courts. Our multi-layered model addresses this criticism by offering litigants guarantees on 
core process values, predictability on the problem solving process and accountability on the 
mediator’s ethical behavior. We suggest strengthening these core qualities of the model with 
mandatory training for mediators to learn essential techniques. This is the final element of the 
“Integrative Judicial Mediation” model that will be explored in the next section.     
 
 
E.  Training and Specialization 
 
The integrity of the judicial mediation process is guaranteed by several guiding principles and 
ethics as explored in the previous layers of our model. Regardless of their approach and 
working style, all mediators must guarantee the quality of the process as well as acquire and 
maintain professional qualifications required to perform effective facilitated negotiations. The 
                                               
87 State Courts of Singapore, Code of Ethics and Basic Principles on Court Mediation, supra note 16, para 4.1b. 
88 Id., at para 4.1(b). 
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success of a judicial mediation system ultimately rests on developing a high quality of 
mediation skills89. While there could ostensibly be a process framework based on co-existence 
of mediation principles and values of the justice system, what is more critical is to have judges 
who have been trained to develop and hone these skills.  
 
As demonstrated above, the existence of unethical or coercive mediation practices has the 
potential to mar the entire standing of the judicial mediation process.  Furthermore, many critics 
have doubted judges’ innate capacity to perform mediation. Admittedly, not all judges would 
have the suitable temperament to be competent facilitators using dialogue as the main tool for 
dispute resolution. Selection of judges that will perform judicial mediation is a vital first step. 
In addition, we suggest the selected judges should be adequately trained and engage in some 
degree of specialization in dispute resolution. Although not every judge will feel comfortable 
to practice judicial mediation, we believe a training program should be mandatory for for all 
judges involved in some form of dispute resolution. This ensures that they will understand its 
potential to provide access to justice to litigants and how facilitated negotiation can be used 
with the objective of proper case management 90. Based on best practices in the mediation field 
as well as Canadian judicial mediation training programs91, we suggest that judges should learn 
the following techniques: (1) communication skills, (2) value assessment skills, (3) trust 
building skills, and (4) skills to facilitate negotiation.  
 
 
Mediation 
Techniques 
Role of mediators 
Communication skills Asking open-ended questions.  
Developing active listening and reframing to change perspective 
from negative resistance to positive problem solving.  
Value assessment 
skills 
Looking for global value resulting from instrumental motives and 
social connectors of every party.  
Trust building skills Looking for trustworthiness resulting from an anticipated cost-
benefit ratio and perceived mutual similarities.  
Skills to facilitate 
negotiation 
Stimulating curiosity and creativity between parties to facilitate 
negotiation based on common interests, preferences, differences 
and cost-minimization.  
                                               
89 For empirical studies of skills used by judges while performing settlement conferences, see Peter Robinson, An 
Empirical Study of Settlement Conference Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, 
Compromise, and Fear 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2012); Peter Robinson, Opening Pandora's Box: An 
Empirical Exploration of Judicial Settlement Ethics and Techniques, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53 (2012); 
Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge - Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An Empirical 
Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113 (2009). 
90 In Canada, Quebec civil law judges are all required to follow judicial mediation training with the main objective 
to develop a shared knowledge of its potential to facilitate access to justice. Judges have to follow a skills-based 
training program delivered by National Judicial Institute before they engage in judicial mediation functions. Such 
mandatory training pursue effective and harmonized practices in sustaining settlement discussions.  
91 In Canada, National Judicial Institute offers four different skills-based program (three days each) exploring 
competencies necessary for judges facilitating negotiations between parties. See https://www.nji-inm.ca. 
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Table 5. Mediation techniques learned through training and specialization.  
 
 
Providing mediation training to judges reinforces the probability that the process is conducted 
efficiently, core values are followed and ethical duties are respected. Communication skills 
refer to the interaction between listening, questioning and reframing. The objective is to create 
a dialogue leading to a mutual understanding instead of a debate where parties try to persuade 
each other of the merit of their case. Good listening can help parties provide each other 
feedback to show understanding which will have a positive effect on trust building. Good 
questioning will aim toward curiosity instead of judgment. Questions are useful to discover 
interests underlying factual statements. Good questioning helps the parties to expand and 
clarify their views and provides an opportunity to explain the relationship of one idea to another. 
Parties can also re-examine what they previously said and re-assess their views to improve 
mutual understanding.  
 
Value assessment skills correspond to the ability for the mediator to identify the parties’ 
motivations to cooperate and engage in a negotiated agreement. What value, whether of an 
instrumental nature or social nature, is at stake for litigants? By instrumental we refer to 
material self-interest sustained by incentives, sanctions and dependences, related to cost or 
delays for instance. 92  Social connection corresponds to internal predispositions driving 
behaviors and the desire to engage in a relationship.93 People may be willing to cooperate 
because of their (individual or shared) beliefs, values and identification with one another such 
as similar management approach, prospective of market growth for businesses, or shared 
environmental care beliefs or moral standards for individuals, etc. In judicial mediation, no 
priority should be given to one approach or the other given the centrality of party self-
determination.  
 
Trust-building skills correspond to the ability for the mediator to create trustworthiness 
between parties and lead them to some partnership to solve their dispute94. Trust is a necessary 
condition for cooperation. Therefore, mediators can help parties evaluate to what extent every 
party can trust each other. Anticipated positive balance in terms of benefits compared to costs 
lead to a “working partner” relationship driven by the instrumental desire to get rewards and 
                                               
92 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE? 13 (Princeton University Press 2011).  
93 Id, at 31-42. 
94 Roy J. Lewicki & Carolyn Wiethoff, Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 86 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000); Roy J. Lewicki, Trust and Distrust, 
in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 191 (Andrea K. 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Jean-François Roberge & Roy J. Lewicki, Should We Trust 
Grand Bazaar Carpet Sellers (and vice versa)?, in VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM. RETHINKING 
NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 421 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben 
& Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2010).  
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avoid sanctions95. When solving the dispute out of court is more appealing than pursuing to 
trial, we are in a situation where “calculus based trust”96 developed amongst parties will likely 
lead them to a negotiated agreement.  Perceived similarities can also play a role in building 
trust between parties leading to a “friendly partner’s” relationship. Under the guidance of a 
mediator, the parties can explore common visions and beliefs, shared values, as well as 
compatible goals. Thus the judge mediator guides the parties to develop quality communication 
oriented towards mutual understanding. Partners willing to “put themselves in the other’s shoes” 
will be able to make a judgment on trustworthiness based on reciprocal similarity, leading to 
“identity based trust”97 amongst parties. Cooperation will be more reliable and sustainable if 
both types of trust (calculus based and identity based) are developed between partners.      
 
Another essential competency for a judge mediator is to sustain negotiation settlement 
discussions between litigants. Stimulating curiosity and creativity between parties to facilitate 
negotiation could be learned through techniques focusing on their common interests, 
preferences, differences, and cost-minimization98. Looking for the underlying interests of 
parties at stake corresponds to using their real motivations as the object of negotiation, instead 
of the firm positions they would like the other to comply with99. Interests are objectives while 
positions are means to attain them. One objective can be fulfilled with different compatible 
means. For instance, satisfying an employee could be possible through a raise or improvement 
of pension plans or even with flexible work schedule, depending on his situation as single 
person looking to buy a property, or as a seasoned worker closed to his retirement, or as a 
young family father who wants to spend more time with his children.  
 
A “partnership exploration” technique could be used by judges with the objective of exploring 
shared incentives to become partners that could be mobilized into a new joint objective. Mutual 
interests to overcome a joint peril, such as a loss of market share, or to improve their common 
benefits, such as diversifying services to better serve the needs of clients, can be mobilized to 
creatively resolve the dispute. Interests can also be prioritized and used in a negotiation 
technique called “rotation of interests” where every party fulfill his top priority because of a 
reciprocal exchange where one party exchanges with the other something that has less value 
for him but has significant value for the other. “Costs minimization” is another possible 
                                               
95  Roberge & Lewicki, supra note 94; See also William A. Donohue, Resolving Relational Paradox. The 
Language of Conflict in Relationships, in The Language of Conflict and Resolution, (William F. Eadie & Paul E. 
Nelson eds., 2001). 
96 Lewicki & Wiethoff, supra note 94, at 88, 92 (Calculus based trust is “an ongoing, market-oriented, economic 
calculation whose value is determined by the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship 
relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it”) (“It is grounded in impersonal transactions, and the overall 
anticipated benefits to be derived from the relationship are assumed to outweigh any anticipated costs”). 
97  Lewicki & Wiethoff, supra note 94, 93 (Identity based trust “exists because the parties can effectively 
understand and appreciate one another’s wants. This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each 
person can effectively act for the other”.) (“It is grounded in perceived compatibility of values, common goals, 
and positive emotional attachment to the other”.) 
98 Jean-François Roberge & Sylvain Coutlée, Curiosity and Creativity Workshop. Think outside the box!, 
Settlement conference program : clinics, National Judicial Institute (Toronto 2017).  
99 See generally ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES. NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING (Penguin books, 2d ed. 1991).  
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technique that can be used in mediation to facilitate an agreement. An assessment of all costs 
related to pursuing the dispute (economic, emotional, reputational, health related, etc.) could 
be balanced against the advantages of a settlement in a short-term to long-term. Legal risk 
assessment on the probability to win at trial can be combined with an assessment of value at 
risk by continuing the lawsuit, like for instance assets being frozen as legal fees provisions, 
trust erosion by creditors leading to limited credit loans and cash flow difficulties, loss of 
investment opportunity, etc.  
 
In summary, we suggest that judges must be trained to learn a set of cooperation building and 
related skills to become efficient mediators. Acquiring this set of skills should help judge’s 
perform their multi-tasking roles of risk manager, problem solver and justice facilitator to 
sustain productive settlement-oriented discussions. Training judges should increase the 
likelihood of a mutually satisfying solution resulting from a useful and fair process, therefore 
contributing to provide parties the sense that they had access to justice with a “different day in 
court”.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Access to justice has gone through many waves of change in the past decades, and presently 
reflects a fascinating coexistence of consensual and adjudicatory processes as well as a focus 
on individual participation.  Much of this evolution of justice has occurred within the courts, 
evinced by the increasingly multi-faceted role of the judge and the creation of innovative 
processes such as judicial mediation. However, the legitimacy of judicial mediation has been 
severely marred by the lack of clarity of the relationship between the individual streams of 
ADR and adjudication within the justice system. Debates on this subject have vacillated 
between the opposing perspectives of divergence and congruence. Critics have conceptualized 
judicial mediation as either very distinct from justice traditions, or largely similar to the 
adjudication process. As such, the two streams of ADR and adjudication within judicial 
mediation have either remained disparate or have merged in a way that resembles adjudication 
more than mediation.  
 
It has been argued that a renewal in judicial mediation lies in departing from a dichotomous 
approach that favors either mediation or the justice tradition as the more superior process within 
the courts. A sea change has to take place by adopting a coequality perspective to understanding 
and designing judicial mediation. The process has to be shaped in a way that respects the equal 
validity of adjudication and mediation as processes to achieve justice.  Since both processes 
co-exist within the courts, judicial mediation also has to be practiced in a way that does not 
muddy the distinction between them. We have thus suggested that using judges to engage in a 
predominantly facilitative mediation process will greatly enhance the legitimacy of the 
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mediation process as part and parcel of a broader concept of justice. The validity of 
adjudication is concurrently respected since a clear distinction between the judicial mediation 
process and the trial process is maintained.  
 
Our suggested Integrative Judicial Model (IJUM) comprising of five elements is founded on 
the coequality approach. Premised on the user-centric concept of access to justice, this renewed 
model seeks to understand the litigant’s views of justice, the usefulness of the judicial 
mediation process and the sense of being given support by the mediator. These findings on the 
users’ sense of access to justice are used as a basis of designing the process as well as to 
consistently monitor the effectiveness of the process in meeting individual needs. In addition, 
five procedural values premised on the core principles of mediation and the justice system have 
been proposed. To complement these values, we have argued that clear ethical duties consistent 
with the judicial system and the mediator’s role should be publicly articulated in order to 
introduce public accountability to a private and confidential process. It is further argued that 
process harmonization is introduced to ensure that judicial mediation is conducted consistently 
by different judges to properly reflect the articulated procedural values and ethical duties. In 
this connection, we have suggested using a process framework premised primarily on a 
facilitative mediation model for training and continual monitoring of judges. Moreover, it is 
crucial to have clarity on how the position of a judge is to be properly utilized in the process, 
and the common pitfalls to avoid to ensure that due process and the foundational principles of 
mediation are adhered to. Finally, the model stresses the importance of initial and continual 
training of judges, to enable them to hone their skills and develop expertise.  
 
In sum, the IJUM represents a shift in understanding the role of the courts, access to justice 
and how diametrically opposing processes can be properly regarded as part of the justice 
system. The coequality approach is able to properly integrate the variegated developments 
within access to justice, and avoid the pitfall of preferring only one development to the other. 
Divergence and congruence can no longer be an appropriate approach for creating solutions to 
the access to justice challenge. It is timely for judicial mediation be renewed through this 
paradigm shift. As dispute resolution and access to justice within the courts continue to change, 
the coequality approach will also be invaluable in overcoming binary debates and holistically 
developing other innovations within the justice system.  
 
